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AbsTrACT
Resource constraints, value for money debates and 
concerns about provider behaviour have placed 
accountability ‘front and centre stage’ in health system 
improvement initiatives and policy prescriptions. There 
are a myriad of accountability relationships within 
health systems, all of which can be transformed by 
decentralisation of health system decision-making from 
national to subnational level. Many potential benefits of 
decentralisation depend critically on the accountability 
processes and practices of front-line health facility 
providers and managers, who play a central role in 
policy implementation at province, county, district and 
facility levels. However, few studies have examined 
these responsibilities and practices in detail, including 
their implications for service delivery. In this paper we 
contribute to filling this gap through presenting data drawn 
from broader ongoing research collaborations between 
researchers and health managers in Kenya and South 
Africa. These collaborations are aimed at understanding 
and strengthening day-to-day micropractices of health 
system governance, including accountability processes. 
We illuminate the multiple directions and forms of 
accountability operating at the subnational level across 
three sites. Through detailed illustrative examples we 
highlight some of the unintended consequences of 
bureaucratic forms of accountability, the importance of 
relational elements in enabling effective bureaucratic 
accountability, and the ways in which front-line 
managers can sometimes creatively draw upon one set 
of accountability requirements to challenge another set 
to meet their goals. Overall, we argue that interpersonal 
interactions are key to appropriate functioning of many 
accountability mechanisms, and that policies and 
interventions supportive of positive relationships should 
complement target-based and/or audit-style mechanisms 
to achieve their intended effects. Where this is done 
systematically and across key elements and actors of the 
health system, this offers potential to build everyday health 
system resilience.
InTroduCTIon
Resource constraints, value for money debates 
and concerns about provider behaviour have 
placed accountability ‘front and centre stage’ 
in health system improvement initiatives and 
policy prescriptions.1 An accountability focus 
has also been propelled by limited gains in 
health system performance in many low-in-
come/middle-income countries, combined 
with specific concerns about corruption, 
abuse of power, inadequate financial manage-
ment and poor responsiveness to commu-
nity priorities and concerns. The essence of 
accountability is answerability between sets of 
individuals (or ‘actors’) in relation to specific 
activities or interventions, enforced either 
with positive or negative sanctions, or by 
personal or professional ethics such as codes 
of conduct.2 Given the size and complexity of 
health systems, there are a myriad of account-
ability relationships between actors,3 with 
Key questions
What is already known?
 ► Accountability is recognised as being of critical im-
portance in strengthening health systems and their 
performance.
 ► There is limited understanding of the accountability 
responsibilities and practices of front-line providers 
and managers within decentralised systems.
What are the new findings?
 ► Multiple directions and forms of accountability oper-
ate at the subnational level, but there is a dominance 
of bureaucratic accountability mechanisms.
 ► To achieve the good intentions of bureaucratic ac-
countability mechanisms, they require interpersonal 
processes between professionals and between pro-
fessionals and others.
What do the new findings imply?
 ► Policies and interventions supportive of positive rela-
tionships, and that build coproduction, should com-
plement audit-style mechanisms to support positive 
system effects.
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these relationships either ‘internal’ to health bureau-
cracies (such as between colleagues, juniors, managers, 
bosses or funders); or ‘external’, where those working 
in health bureaucracies answer to others outside these 
bureaucracies (such as facility users, community repre-
sentatives or the general public).
Both internal and external accountability relation-
ships can be transformed by decentralisation of health 
systems. In decentralisation, responsibilities, functions 
and resources are transferred from central to lower levels 
of government. Although there are different forms of 
decentralisation (eg, deconcentration, devolution and 
delegation), Mills4 mentions that they do not necessarily 
reflect different degrees of local autonomy. They do, 
however, denote different formal lines of accountability.4 
Devolution may entail more significant decentralisation 
of political, fiscal and administrative decision-making 
authority and greater accountability to local popula-
tions than other forms of decentralisation.  However, 
some degree of accountability to central government 
remains, and the balance of accountability between 
central government and local publics can cause tension.5 
It is argued that the potential benefits of decentralisation 
include improved allocative and technical efficiency as 
a result of greater cost-consciousness and control at the 
local level, as well as strengthening quality, transparency, 
accountability and legitimacy due to greater possibility 
for user oversight and participation in decision-making.6 
Such positive outcomes depend critically, however, on 
the accountability responsibilities and practices of front-
line health facility providers and managers, who play a 
central role in policy implementation at the district and 
local levels.
Although accountability mechanisms ideally ensure 
that front-line health facility providers and managers 
are providing services that are efficient and responsive 
to communities, especially in decentralised systems, the 
literature suggests at least two potential accountability-re-
lated concerns. A first concern is that in delegating deci-
sion-making roles to the local level, governments often 
also apply increasingly stringent audit-style account-
ability requirements on these cadres of staff.3 Audit-style 
bureaucratic accountability requirements are relatively 
detailed, standardised and centralised approaches to 
accountability which are purportedly more uniform, 
objective, rigorous and transparent than more localised 
and face-to-face or ‘interpersonal’ forms.7 Although 
such accountability processes can be argued to build 
trust, facilitate public awareness and empowerment, and 
improve performance, there is also evidence from other 
contexts that these processes can be subject to game-
playing, creative compliance, subjectivity and capacity 
constraints, thereby undermining their potential to 
achieve intended goals.8–10 In giving a false impression of 
trust, transparency and fairness, it has even been argued 
that these processes can be damaging to accountability 
goals.10 11 A second concern for front-line providers and 
managers is that in having to be accountable to many 
different actors within the system, they may be faced with 
conflicting demands, with negative potential implications 
for healthcare efficiency and responsiveness.8 12
Despite its importance, few studies have provided an 
indepth understanding of the accountability respon-
sibilities and practices of front-line health facility 
providers and managers within decentralised systems, 
and the implications for service delivery. In this paper 
we contribute to filling this gap through presenting 
data drawn from broader ongoing research collabora-
tions between researchers and health managers aimed at 
understanding and strengthening day-to-day microprac-
tices of health system governance, including account-
ability processes, at the subnational level in Kenya and 
South Africa. Recognising the everyday decision-making 
and meaning-making of front-line actors,13 we argue that 
interpersonal or relational interactions are key to the 
appropriate functioning of many accountability mecha-
nisms, and that policies and interventions supportive of 
positive interpersonal interactions should support target-
based or audit-style mechanisms to achieve their positive 
intended effects.
MeTHods
Learning site settings and our analytical approach
We have been involved in three long-term collabora-
tions between research teams and health system actors 
in specific districts in Kenya and South Africa. The three 
learning sites are embedded in two different national 
contexts and three, quite different local settings. The 
learning site approach, sites and settings have been 
described in some detail in our companion papers,14 15 
but here we highlight the key points relevant for this 
paper.
In Kenya, considerable political, legislative and admin-
istrative decision-making power across sectors was 
devolved to 47 county governments within a 6-month 
time frame following the election of a new government 
in March 2013. This radical and speedy devolution of 
power represented a major break with the political and 
public management traditions of the country. In the 
health sector, county officials are now responsible for 
medical services, public health and primary healthcare 
(PHC)/promotion, with the national level responsible 
for health policy formulation and regulation functions, 
and national referral hospitals. Accountability structures 
and processes within counties have been and continue 
to be redrawn as a result, causing some confusion and 
conflict among mid-level managers. In South Africa, a 
similar form of decentralisation was instituted following 
the 1994 election of the first post-apartheid government. 
This led to provincial governments being responsible 
for the provision of all health services, the local govern-
ment for a package of ‘municipal PHC services’, and 
the national government for developing overarching 
health policy and health legislation, and supporting spec-
ified prevention and disease control services. The District 
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Health System has consistently been seen as the critical 
platform for strengthening PHC, but uncertainty about 
provincial and local government roles has, as in Kenya, 
provided an unstable context.
Within the two countries, we work in Kilifi County in 
Kenya, one of the 47 counties established within newly 
devolved national governance structures in 2013; and in 
South Africa, in two health districts located in different 
provinces (Sedibeng, Gauteng; and the Mitchells Plain 
area of the Metro District Health System/City of Cape 
Town, Western Capei). We have worked in Mitchells Plain 
since 2010, in Kilifi since 2012 and in Sedibeng since 
2014. These sites were chosen because prior experience 
and engagement with managers provided a foundation 
for longer term collaboration. Sustained engagement 
was then made possible as research teams live locally 
and have maintained trusting relationships with health 
system colleagues over time. The three sites differ signifi-
cantly from each other, with Kilifi being rural while the 
two South African sites are urban; they also have different 
population sizes, proportions living below the national 
poverty line and levels of prioritisation of health in 
budgetary allocations.
With regard to our study approach, the key features are 
as follows:
 ► The overall study design is flexible, with an overall 
interest in understanding the daily routines and chal-
lenges of health managers at various levels of the 
district/county health system.
 ► The study design evolves over the course of a long-
term collaboration between health managers and 
researchers, where we have sought to gather infor-
mation on and make sense of it with our colleagues, 
thereby coproducing knowledge.
 ► The methods of data collection include document 
reviews, indepth interviews, group discussions, as well 
as observations; presenting and discussing ‘findings’ 
with managers (to test them and consider what mana-
gerial implications they have); and reflective discus-
sions within the research teams.
 ► Our data include, in addition to individual and group 
interview transcriptions and notes, reflective notes, 
journal data, presentations to managers, notes from 
feedback meetings and transcripts of our own reflec-
tive discussions.
 ► For each site ethical approval was obtained from rele-
vant national authorities and also from the London 
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine.
In this paper we draw on a range of data sources to 
examine the micropractices involved in the imple-
mentation of accountability mechanisms. As with our 
i  More specifically we have worked in one geographical area in which 
health services are managed by two different health authorities. The 
area is the Mitchells Plain subdistrict of the City of Cape Town, a local 
government authority, which falls within the Mitchells Plain/Klipfon-
tein substructure, one of four within the provincial government’s Metro 
District Health System.
companion paper,14 we followed the principles adapted 
from case study research methodology and meta-syn-
thesis. We, first, collectively read and reflected on 
accountability, then examined our data (both already 
published work and additional primary data), and finally, 
based on comparative analysis of experience across sites, 
developed an initial line of argument. A core team then 
prepared successive, draft manuscripts; and review, revi-
sion and paper finalisation involved further reflection 
among the cross-site authorship team. The cycles of 
reflection and multiple levels of triangulation achieved 
through this process underpin the trustworthiness of the 
resulting analysis.
In our analysis, we drew on two accountability frame-
works in our efforts to unpack the forms of accountability 
observed and the factors that impact on them. This is 
in addition to the basic internal/external and bureau-
cratic/relational distinctions noted above.
Following Hupe and Hill,16 we draw on the idea that 
key actors may be accountable in various relations 
(bottom-up, top-down and ‘sideways’ to peers), and that 
front-line workers and managers are likely to engage 
with two quite contrasting forms of accountability: those 
that are more public-administrative and those that are 
professional-participatory. For the public-administrative 
forms of accountability, the mode of implementation 
is often target-driven towards performance.  Examples 
are provided in box 1.  Public-administrative forms of 
accountability are generally rule-bound or contractual 
relationships, where there is individual compliance to 
rules and targets, organisational conformity to stan-
dard operating procedures and contracts, and a general 
orientation towards achieving tasks or indicators. These 
more bureaucratic forms of accountability differ signifi-
cantly from more professional-participatory account-
ability relationships, where the mode of implementation 
is more likely to be a form of coproduction among staff 
and with community/citizens/clients. These forms of 
accountability are often more trust-based, with indi-
vidual compliance to internalised professional standards, 
organisational conformity to shared goals and standard 
Box 1 examples of internal bureaucratic accountability 
mechanisms in place in all three sites
 ► Staff performance appraisal.
 ► Clinic supervision visits.
 ► Quality of care audits.
 ► Performance monitoring.
 ► Service reports.
 ► Monthly reports.
 ► Financial management reports.
 ► Budgeting processes.
 ► Target setting meetings.
 ► Facility statistics reports.
 ► Disease programme reporting.
 ► Procurement requirements.
 ► Pharmaceutical supply reports.
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setting, and a general orientation towards performance 
as achievement of wider public value. Of interest in our 
analysis is what forms of accountability are revealed in 
examining the micropractices of governance on the 
ground, including which forms are given higher priority, 
and what the implications of these practices are for indi-
viduals, the system and public health.
From Cleary et al,17 we draw on the literature review 
finding that bureaucratic accountability mechanisms 
internal to health system hierarchies can constrain the 
functioning of external accountability mechanisms. 
For example, responding to the expectations of rela-
tively powerful managers further up the system may 
constrain health providers’ efforts to respond to the 
needs of citizens and patients. Cleary et al17 note that 
it is the interaction between bureaucratic and external 
accountability mechanisms that ultimately determines 
the extent to which the health system provides care to 
its citizens. If and how accountability processes support 
responsiveness to patients and citizens was found to be 
influenced by (1) the values, norms, institutions and 
culture of healthcare, versus citizens and patients; (2) 
the attitudes and perceptions of providers, managers, 
bureaucrats and policymakers, versus citizens and 
patients; and (3) the resources and capabilities of the 
health service, versus citizens and patients17. In our 
analysis we consider if and how internal bureaucratic 
accountability mechanisms are crowding out external 
accountability, and potential influences of account-
ability realities for responsiveness of healthcare to 
patients and citizens.
resuLTs
Following an overview of the multiple directions and 
forms of accountability operating at the subnational 
level across the three learning sites, we give more 
detailed illustrations of the micropractices of account-
ability we observed, including some of the unintended 
consequences of bureaucratic forms of accountability, 
the importance of relational elements in enabling posi-
tive goals of bureaucratic accountability and the ways 
in which one set of accountability requirements can be 
creatively drawn on to challenge another.
Multiple directions and forms of accountability
Three accountability maps (figures 1–3) were devel-
oped on the basis of discussions with health managers 
operating at the subnational levels of the health system 
about who they are answerable to and in what way. 
These maps include both formally agreed lines of 
accountability (in relation to line management and 
financial answerability, for example) but also, in some 
cases, more informal lines of accountability that had 
nonetheless become institutionalised at the time of our 
fieldwork.
There are some common features across these maps.
First, they all reveal the multiple and multidirectional 
accountability demands that health managers face at all 
levels, including accountability upwards to managers, 
accountability across and down to colleagues and staff, 
and accountability outwards to facility users and the 
public.
Second, in all settings separate lines of responsibility 
have the potential to undermine service delivery in 
different ways. In South Africa there are different types 
of bureaucratic accountability in each site. In Sedibeng 
(figure 1), there are two lines of accountability—one 
for ‘Corporate Services’ (ie, all support services such as 
finance, information technology, supply chain, human 
resources and so on) and one for service delivery. This 
separation inevitably brings challenges in ensuring the 
synergy between functions needed to support service 
delivery, and may explain the emergence of more 
informal, but now quite fairly institutionalised forms 
of accountability among assistant directors in each line 
function. In Mitchells Plain, Cape Town (figure 2), there 
is accountability to both provincial and local government 
authorities for service delivery, and the interim subdis-
trict management team, an informal but now institution-
alised forum, seeks to provide a venue for coordinating 
activities between these different authorities. In Kilifi 
(figure 3) there is a technical line of accountability of 
county health managers upwards to the national ministry 
of health and a separate political one up to the national 
senate through the county executive committee.
A third common feature of these maps is that they 
indicate a strong focus on formal internal accountability 
up the health and administration system hierarchies in 
each setting, as opposed to outwards to communities or 
the broader public. Box 1 above provides some exam-
ples of the kinds of mechanisms reported to enact the 
accountability lines in the maps, each of which involves 
a complex web of activities and responsibilities with an 
overall upwards focus. The way these mechanisms are 
enacted is largely bureaucratic in that there is a general 
orientation towards compliance to rules and targets as 
assessed through completion of forms and reports, as 
opposed to being more internalised and trust-based, as 
discussed in more detail below.
Finally, the fourth feature of these maps is that some 
informal forms of accountability have become relatively 
formalised or institutionalised and influence health 
managers. For example in Sedibeng, there are numerous 
interactions between the assistant directors of different 
departments such as PHC, programmes and administra-
tion, in which there are constant discussions about whether 
or not tasks and activities are being achieved, illustrating 
a form of peer accountability. In Kilifi, although facility 
managers are not formally and directly answerable to the 
new locally elected politicians—Members of the County 
Assembly (MCA)—some MCAs demand answerability from 
facility managers because they feel they have been given 
a mandate by the public to oversee government services 
including health facilities in their constituencies.
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bureaucratic accountability: laudable intentions and 
unintended consequences
As noted above, the accountability maps and discus-
sions highlight the dominance of internal, bureau-
cratic processes, including those listed in box 1. Many 
of these mechanisms have laudable goals, with poten-
tially important positive implications for healthcare 
provision and ultimately public health. However we 
often observed in learning site day-to-day routines that 
in practice these mechanisms can be demanding in 
time and energy and distracting from other activities 
and priorities. This can have negative implications for 
staff motivation, health delivery and ultimately public 
health.
An example of the laudable goals but practical realities 
of internal bureaucratic accountability processes is target 
setting in Cape Town. As described by Gilson et al18, annual 
targets have been set up in South Africa as one of a set of 
accountability mechanisms to track progress towards stra-
tegic plans, including to improve PHC services. As shown 
in vignette 1, they were perceived as very positive by senior 
managers, but very differently by front-line managers who 
found them disempowering and demotivating. Rather 
than recognising the value of the target setting processes, 
the PHC facility managers in Cape Town were therefore 
observed to merely comply with the reporting tasks, 
applying little effort towards wider improvements in PHC 
services,18 limiting the intended benefits of the targets.
Figure 1 Accountability map of Sedibeng District, 2016. NGOs, non-governmental organisations; PHC, primary healthcare. 
 o
n
 20 August 2018 by guest. Protected by copyright.
http://gh.bmj.com/
BM
J G
lob Health: first published as 10.1136/bmjgh-2018-000842 on 6 July 2018. Downloaded from 
6 Nxumalo N, et al. BMJ Glob Health 2018;3:e000842. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2018-000842
BMJ Global Health
Responding to similar top-down accountability 
processes, facility incharges in Kilifi are typically required 
to both manage their facilities and provide services. They 
complete an array of monthly reports submitted to line 
managers to support planning, monitor performance and 
workload, and facilitate oversight of resources. Although 
facility managers felt these processes were important to 
enable resource allocation, and plan supportive super-
vision, mentorship and coaching, they also complained 
about the amount of paper-filling and reporting 
(table 112) that they have to do, variously describing it 
as ‘overwhelming’, ‘repetitious’, ‘confusing’, ‘tedious’ 
and ‘distracting’ from clinical care. There was also little 
direct positive feedback from these exercises, but rather 
concerns about being blamed and penalised for any 
mistakes. As noted by Nyikuri et al12:
Reporting challenges are largely with upward accountabil-
ity, with financial reports in particular considered difficult 
and worrying given that in-charges can be held formally 
responsible for any anomalies…
In Kilifi, facility incharges’ concerns about account-
ability responsibilities are in a context of significant 
resource constraints, remuneration anxieties and lack 
of preparedness to conduct their managerial roles. 
Where accountability requirements unnecessarily detract 
from clinical care through, for example, duplication of 
forms, or gathered data never actually being used by 
those demanding it, they potentially undermine the very 
services they are designed to support.
Sedibeng showed a similar experience of some poten-
tially valuable accountability mechanisms being imple-
mented in such a way as to undermine the intention of 
Figure 2 Accountability map of the City of Cape Town/Metro District Health Services, 2013. HR, human resource; NGO, non-
governmental organisation; PHC, primary healthcare. 
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the mechanism. Researchers observed, for example, that 
supervision processes had become so orientated around 
ensuring that facilities comply with stringent National 
Core Standards that there was little support offered to 
those being supervised. To illustrate, a manager reported 
that a detailed manual they used had reduced super-
vision visits to going through a lengthy checklist of 
requirements:
The supervisory manual is actually limited to being compli-
ant to the core standards. There’s just a dashboard of in-
dicators…elements that you are looking to help the clinic 
to get to this compliance. There are 196 elements that you 
need to assess and it is not just to say, yes it was not there. 
You have to interrogate; what is the element, is it really ac-
cording to the documents? So a supervisory visit takes up 
to six to eight hours. It consumes a lot of time. (Sedibeng 
interview, Mid-level manager 1, 2014)
Another example of the laudable goals but practical 
realities of internal bureaucratic accountability processes 
is the implementation of the Performance Management 
and Development System (PMDS) in Sedibeng. A PMDS 
(figure 4) is aimed at ensuring that all government 
employees develop the skills and implement the activities 
required to achieve the health system’s goals. It involves a 
12-month cycle over which performance is collaboratively 
planned, executed and assessed between employer and 
employee. The final of four steps involves the employer 
and supervisor reviewing performance, agreeing a final 
score rating, and discussing career incidences such as pay 
progression and performance awards. The score rating 
ranges from 1 (unacceptable) to 5 (outstanding), with 5 
indicating the employee far exceeds the expected stand-
ards for the job and qualifies for an award.
Figure 3 Accountability map of Kilifi County, 2017. NGO, non-governmental organisations; PHC, primary healthcare.
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The PMDS should ensure supportive interaction 
between the supervisor and the employees throughout 
the cycle, including allowing both parties to ‘identify 
and provide the support needed’ and to ‘ensure contin-
uous learning and development’.19 However Sedibeng 
managers’ comments of how this performance manage-
ment tool is implemented illustrate how formulaic it has 
become:
Our performance management and development system is 
not aligned to operational plans…so outputs on PMDS are 
very vague. For some jobs there aren’t specific measurable 
goals, the items are too general. It has also become some-
thing that people comply to…they just change the dates. 
(Sedibeng interview, Senior manager 11, 2015)
…the system has now been designed that you get a score 
from 2 to 4. To avoid fighting [between manager and sub-
ordinates] people just give people a 4. It is a system that 
doesn’t work. (Senior manager and research team reflec-
tive meeting notes, 4 August 2015)
The latter quote illustrates the observation that 
managers give out scores regardless of merit in order to 
avoid contestation and maintain relationships.
enabling bureaucratic accountability through emphasis on 
relational elements
In the previous section we showed that accounta-
bility mechanisms have good intentions and are often 
designed to include relational/interpersonal elements—
for example, feedback meetings and opportunities for 
discussion and reflection. In practice, these good inten-
tions can be undermined by implementation realities 
which reduce these processes to tick-box-style, routi-
nised, depersonalised activities. In addition these reali-
ties appear to be aimed more at maintaining the status 
Table 1 Financial reporting tools and processes12
Clinical forms to show performance Financial manuals and forms
MOH711: TB control data. Guidelines and reference documents. Receipt vouchers (F017).
MOH711A: Integrated RH, HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, TB and nutrition.
Managing HSSF, an operations manual. Payment vouchers (F021).
MOH113: Nutrition monthly reporting. Guidelines on financial management for 
HSSF.
Travel imprest form (F022).
MOH717: Service workload. Chart on accounts. Local purchase orders.
MOH718: Inpatient morbidity and 
mortality.
Registers and books to be completed. Local service orders.
MOH729AF: CDRR for ARV and OI 
medicine.
Memorandum vote book. Request for quotations.
MOH730: Facility monthly ARV patient. Receipt book. Stock cards for all items in stores.
MOH731: Comprehensive HIV/AIDS 
facility reporting form.
Facility service register. Imprest warrants.
MOH733B: Nutrition services summary 
tool.
Cash book. Bank reconciliation forms (F030).
MOH734F: CDRR HIV nutrition 
commodity.
Cheque book. Counter requisition and issue 
vouchers (S11).
MOH105: Service delivery report. Cheque book register. Counter receipt vouchers (S13).
MOH515: Chew summary. Fixed asset register. Handover forms.
MOH710: Vaccines and immunisation. Imprest register. Monthly financial report forms.
Consumables stock register. Monthly expenditure report forms.
Store register. Quarterly financial report forms.
Receipt book register. Other items register.
Forms/vouchers.
ARV, antiretrovirals; CDRR, Consumption Data Report & Request; HSSF, Health Sector Services Fund; MOH, Ministry of Health; RH, 
reproductive health; OI, Opportunistic Infection; TB,  tuberculosis.
Figure 4 Performance Management and Development 
System cycle.
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quo than at building relationships and transforming 
practice. Nevertheless, there are examples from each site 
and across all of the processes listed in box 1 of managers 
emphasising relational elements to enable internal 
accountability processes.
In Cape Town, for example, managers who were 
concerned about the didactic way that performance 
development meetings were implemented began to 
create new spaces for discussion on achievements, chal-
lenges and priorities between facility and subdistrict 
managers. These new meeting spaces became opportu-
nities for team building and for creating new alternative 
forms of accountability where “it’s not [just] about holding 
people accountable, but providing a space to be supportive in 
holding them accountable” (Researcher field notes, 6 June 
2012).18
In Kilifi, it was clear how crucial the interpersonal 
elements of supervisory processes are. In this context, 
facility incharges reported the potential to feel forgotten 
and isolated in dealing with significant resource 
constraints and other work-related challenges in what can 
be physically very distant facilities. A subcounty health 
manager mentioned that she encourages the incharges 
being posted to new facilities to contact her if they have 
any problems rather than to ‘go and die suffering alone’. 
Another male subcounty manager described monthly 
supervision visits to facilities as an important opportunity:
 …to interact with the facility staff, so that you can identi-
fy with them any problems and possibly support them to 
see that they don’t continue suffering. Otherwise, others 
may be very discouraged; others may be very demoralized 
to remain in the facilities if nobody ever goes to say hi to 
them. But if you go there, you chat with them. If possible 
you take a drink with them. They feel I’m not wasted; I’m 
not alone…12
Such visits, when they happen, are highly appreciated 
by the incharges with the importance of the relational 
elements of supervisory visits apparently recognised by 
managers. Aware that these monthly visits often do not 
happen because of resource challenges at the subcounty 
level, managers introduced—as an additional interaction 
point—monthly meetings in the county headquarters 
for all facility incharges. These meetings involve sharing 
of information, tracking of progress, and discussing 
Vignette 1
The targets—for example, tuberculosis cure rates, immunisation 
coverage, service provision targets—are backed up by regular 
monitoring through ‘plan, do, review’ meetings where managers at 
different levels come together to examine facility, subdistrict and 
district performance against targets, identify challenges, and develop 
actions to address them. Gilson et al18 reported that mid and senior 
health managers saw these processes as providing the following:
 ► Standardised frameworks to guide lower level managers and, more 
specifically providers, to work differently to better meet population 
health needs.
 ► A stable structure within which people know what is expected of 
them.
 ► Direction towards common goals and providing people with a mo-
tivating force.
Taking this perspective, Gilson et al18 argued that reaching a target 
can be seen to bring a sense of achievement and positive energy. 
However primary healthcare facility managers and staff talked very 
differently and much more negatively about targets. They generally 
describe them as disempowering, as some form of disciplinary tool, 
and as encouraging or enabling micromanagement by higher level 
managers. As the authors noted18:
Perhaps refracted through the prism of history and wider 
organizational culture, facility managers seem to understand 
the word ‘targets’ as authoritarian and therefore illegitimate 
(Gilson et al,18): “It’s all that is bad in the system…it also 
says ‘we don’t have agency’…‘we are bombarded, can’t do 
anything else’, so it removes accountability and responsibility 
for anything other than the target” and so “a lot of the target 
conversation is completely disembodied, it’s removed from the 
actual meeting of service needs”. (Research meeting notes—5 
December 2012 from Gilson et al,18)
Vignette 2
In the district, there are a range of accountability requirements for 
procurement, including the need to request for purchases to the Basic 
Expenditure Committee (BEC) and to work under time-bound contracts 
with regular suppliers. Managers cannot purchase an item without 
a prior agreement and a contract as that would be a violation of the 
formal procurement process. A contract expired with a bakery and had 
not been renewed, but the manager decided to continue accepting 
bread from the bakery to feed patients in the maternity ward, many of 
whom stay for several days:
So the bakery will continue delivering…because in the district 
we cannot say that the contract has ended, therefore we will 
not accept bread, because we have patients that need the 
bread. We accept the bread knowing exactly that this was 
done without a purchase order number. Remember, services 
rendered without a purchase order is a violation; it constitutes 
irregular and wasteful expenditure. This is where one has to 
be bold…Do patients suffer without food in the district or do I 
have to put my head on the block? (Sedibeng interview, Senior 
manager 6, 2014)
This manager was clearly torn between his responsibilities to the 
patients versus following due process, as he is accountable to two 
different constituencies. There is a formal process in place to explain 
such a violation: a submission is made to the BEC, headed by a 
senior officer of finance and a senior officer of supply chain. If the 
explanation is considered justified and reasonable, then no action 
is taken against the individual. However it takes a committed and 
confident manager to resort to such a process:
So when BEC has looked at the repercussion, if they feel that 
I was saving the department because we were going to be 
on the first page of the newspaper, then they would approve. 
But in other cases, when they feel that you had time to follow 
the correct procedure and you did not, and instead ended up 
acting as though it was an emergency, they say corrective 
measures have to be taken on the Officer…you would be given 
a written warning. So they give some form of punishment. 
(Sedibeng interview, Senior manager 6, 2014)
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problems and solutions among peers, as well as the delib-
erate inclusion of examples of good practice from some 
facilities to inspire others. The meetings allow commu-
nication of new developments in the region and feed-
back to everybody on issues raised in more individualised 
supervision meetings. As with the supervisory visits to 
facilities, the relational elements of these monthly meet-
ings are highly valued by facility incharges.
Creatively using bureaucratic accountability mechanisms to 
challenge rules imposed from above
Beyond observing front-line managers enabling bureau-
cratic accountability through emphasising relational 
elements and positive feedback processes, we also 
observed managers exercising their agency to actively 
work across their accountability responsibilities and rela-
tionships to ensure continued provision of services. We 
noted the creative use of one set of accountability rela-
tionships (eg, to line managers or to community repre-
sentatives) being drawn on to challenge another, in such 
a way that supported those managers to achieve their 
goals. In some cases this creativity is seen in actions that 
may seem relatively small and insignificant, but which 
can be critical in facilitating health facility functioning, 
especially when considering many such actions being 
implemented at different levels of the system. In other 
cases the creativity is relatively dramatic, with important 
widespread implications. Negotiations can become quite 
complex, drawing in a range of actors and requiring 
significant interpersonal skills.
An example of an arguably small action with important 
implications was a manager in Sedibeng transgressing a 
procurement rule to ensure his responsibility to patients 
(to have food) was met (vignette 2). What can be observed 
in this example is the way in which a manager appealed 
to his own and the wide systems’ accountability respon-
sibility to the public to support his actions, for which he 
was potentially sanctionable.
In Kilifi we observed a relatively dramatic case of creative 
use of accountability mechanisms, with important wide-
spread implications (vignette 3). In this case a subcounty 
manager who had worked in the region for several decades 
used two formal accountability mechanisms—an external 
accountability mechanism of a health facility committee 
with elected community representation, and a facility 
incharges’ answerability to that subcounty manager—to 
challenge the intended implementation by a new more 
senior county health manager of a top-down mandate 
(to remove user fees). Although the challenges of user 
fees are widely recognised locally and internationally, 
suddenly removing them without adequate planning and 
alternative sources of income can cause major challenges 
for service delivery. This was a concern for providers 
across the county. The subcounty manager was able to 
draw on formal accountability responsibilities,  long-term 
relationships and an indepth institutional knowledge 
gained over time to temporarily continue the charging 
of user fees and achieve the objective of keeping services 
open during a time of crisis, an important achievement at 
least in the short term not only for the facility where the chal-
lenge was initiated, but across the entire county. As with 
the Sedibeng example, we see managerial agency, where 
a relatively empowered individual manages upwards, and 
in this case also outwards to community members, in 
order to achieve service delivery.
dIsCussIon
In this paper we have drawn on long-term, primarily 
qualitative research conducted in three different district 
health system settings in Kenya and South Africa to 
present evidence of the micropractices of accountability 
among front-line managers at the subnational level. Here 
we discuss our three key findings in turn, relating them 
to the wider literature. In discussing each, we refer back 
to Hupe and Hill’s16 distinction between more public-ad-
ministrative and more professional-participatory forms of 
accountability, and in particular highlight the importance 
in practice of coproduction as a mode of implementa-
tion across both. Coproduction implies interpersonal 
interaction and collaboration between professionals and 
between professionals and others (community members, 
researchers) to achieve individual and system goals. It 
can be used to describe the relational or interpersonal 
elements that we observed are built into the design of 
many bureaucratic accountability mechanisms but that 
are often lost in implementation practice, with negative 
implications for staff motivation, service delivery and ulti-
mately public health. Relatedly, our experiences show 
the importance of managerial agency in working with 
multiple accountability lines, suggesting that approaches 
need to be found to recognise, value and even enable this 
agency where it is used to support health system goals.
Front-line managers operate in a web of accountability 
responsibilities and demands
We have shown that front-line managers working in facili-
ties and at subnational levels operate in a complex web of 
accountability demands. They are answerable to a range 
of different actors in different directions and in ways that 
can conflict with each other. This observation has been 
made by others from across a wide range of disciplines. 
Hupe and Hill,16 for example, talked about ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ in public policy being:
… held accountable in different ways and to varying de-
grees…Within the web of these multiple accountabilities 
which produce possibly contradictory action imperatives, 
street-level bureaucrats constantly weigh how to act (p296).
We showed potential conflicting lines of account-
ability among the Kilifi facility managers, for 
example, who were concerned that meeting their 
upward accountability demands (form filling) was 
distracting them from their clinical duties. This 
pattern and concern has been noted elsewhere in 
Kenyan health centres and dispensaries,20 and in 
other settings.21–23 In India, for example, Fochsen et 
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al21 noted that tuberculosis doctors working in organ-
isations perceived as inefficient and resource-con-
strained faced a dilemma of how to balance meeting 
the obligations of the directly observed treatment, 
short-course programme with what were often quite 
different needs and expectations of patients. Similar 
accountability tensions within hierarchical health 
systems are highlighted elsewhere. For instance 
centralised decision-making processes in Ghana24 
reduced capacity for district-level responsiveness to 
the implementation of policies. In India,9 as much 
as bureaucratic accountability mechanisms took 
place through a top-down mode, front-line workers 
managed the conflicting accountability relationships 
through informal negotiations. Consequently, this 
altered formal mechanisms in ways that sometimes 
compromised service delivery.9
Where accountability responsibilities conflict, front-
line managers have to make choices. As well as noting 
that accountability upwards to line managers often 
‘wins’, because those managers and others higher up 
the system have the potential to enact sanctions, we 
also observed in both South Africa and Kenya that some 
managers take significant risks in an effort to meet 
the needs of patients and the public (eg, confronting 
senior staff or going against rules). Actions that chal-
lenge health system hierarchies and system policies 
require confidence and commitment, and in some 
cases careful negotiation across a wide range of actors. 
Drawing also on Cleary et al,17 the choices that managers 
make in such situations of conflict, and their implica-
tions for service delivery, are likely to be centrally influ-
enced by the attitudes, perceptions, values and beliefs 
of all of those potentially involved. Understanding and 
working to align potentially diverse positions require 
creativity and agency among front-line managers, 
and interaction and collaboration with others. These 
forms of coproduction are likely to be influenced by 
the resources available to managers (personnel, funds 
and so on) as well as their capabilities (technical and 
interpersonal).
Do front-line managers' and others’ creative account-
ability actions have wider and longer term implica-
tions for the resilience of health systems in the face 
of the routine, multiple challenges they face?  This 
is influenced by if and how the new ideas or ways of 
working become embedded over time in relationships 
and managerial routines.14 Where new relationships 
and managerial routines are observed, further anal-
ysis is required to examine whether these indicate or 
nurture resilience (where organisational functioning 
is strengthened) or ‘maladapted emergence’ (where 
organisational practices are undesirable or unsustain-
able). Our analysis presented elsewhere14 is that the 
reintroduction of user fees in Kilifi to cope with funding 
shortfalls, despite a prior policy decision to remove 
them because they reduce access for the poorest, is 
an example of maladapted emergence, whereas the 
introduction of regular meetings for all PHC incharges 
is an illustration of organisational strengthening.
Accountability processes are often shaped by audit-style, 
bureaucratic mechanisms
While recognising their multidirectional and conflictual 
nature, our findings indicate that many accountability 
responsibilities do nevertheless operate vertically—
linking front-line providers to the state through bureau-
cratic accountability mechanisms. As noted in the back-
ground, audit-style bureaucratic accountability require-
ments are relatively detailed, standardised and central-
ised approaches to accountability. Efforts to ensure that 
healthcare services are efficient, effective and equitable, 
and a recognition that front-line managers have the 
potential to exercise discretion in policy implementa-
tion, have led to the emergence of a global culture where 
authorities are constantly introducing ‘more rules, tighter 
control, and stricter procedures’.16 We found that such 
mechanisms, although often well intended, are often 
reduced in practice to tick-box-style, routinised, deper-
sonalised activities aimed more at maintaining the status 
quo than at building relationships and transforming 
practice. Front-line managers in Cape Town, for instance, 
found the annual target setting and reviewing processes 
to be authoritarian micromanagement, with much of the 
conversation ‘completely disembodied [and] removed from the 
actual meeting of service needs’ (Research meeting notes—5 
December,18 p7). In Kenya submitting monthly reports 
often required considerable effort and time, despite 
recognition of duplication and inadequacies across forms. 
Similar findings have been documented elsewhere. In 
Vignette 3
On 1 June 2013, the President of Kenya announced the removal 
of user fees and maternity fees from primary health facilities. The 
Government was going to compensate the facilities through direct 
funding to their bank accounts. However, 4 months down the line, no 
funds had been transferred to facilities, leading to a cash crisis—
casual workers and utility bills went unpaid, and outreaches could 
not be conducted. In the face of water and electricity disconnection, 
filthy facilities (with casual staff leaving) and imminent closure, 
one facility incharge turned to her facility committee for a solution. 
Together with her committee they agreed to reintroduce user fees 
until the Government released the promised money. On learning of this 
development from Members of the County Assembly, a senior county 
manager sought to know under whose power the incharge had acted 
against a Presidential directive. This incident prompted a visit to the 
facility by a very high-level county team, without informing or inviting 
subcounty-level managers (previously and possibly still the direct 
supervisors of the facility incharges). The facility committee stood 
their ground and supported the incharge, and managed to convince 
senior county managers that services could not stall because of 
central government delays in funding. This innovation by one facility in 
charge with her committee became an official temporary solution for 
the whole county.
Source: Researchers reflective meeting 25_10_2013.
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India, for example, health workers expressed dissatis-
faction with targets:Every month, it is the same meeting, 
the same subjects, same reports and same faces and are 
rigidly focused on targets as opposed to quality of work; 
'All they are interested in is whether you fill in the reports 
and comply with targets…They are not interested in the 
work we do' (p 211).9
Thus our research offers some support to the idea that 
there is an emerging ‘audit society’ in which achieving 
organisational legitimacy is prioritised over and poten-
tially even undermines efficiency and quality, and where 
the day-to-day operations of officials are monitored 
and regulated through ‘ritualized practices’.23 25 Given 
typical power differentials between the accountee and 
the accountor, a relationship of upward accountability 
is created, in which organisational culture of constant 
reference to and dependence on central authorities is 
perpetuated.26 We observed this general upwards pattern 
and emphasis of bureaucratic accountability in Kenya 
and South Africa, even in the context of devolution in 
Kenya. In fact regarding the latter, we have shown else-
where that there has even been a form of ‘re-central-
ization’ under devolution, where previous authority at 
the hospital level has been transferred to higher up the 
system at the county level.27
We noted in the previous section the importance of 
creativity and agency among front-line managers, and 
of interaction and collaboration with others—or copro-
duction—in making sure that accountability respon-
sibilities to patients and the public are met in the face 
of competing accountability upwards. Achallenge with 
some of the implementation realities of bureaucratic 
accountability mechanisms is that they can in fact crowd 
out relational/interpersonal elements, as well as stifle 
the local-level innovations and resilience that can be 
vital to improving responsiveness to communities and 
healthcare services.17 That agency is removed or stifled 
is illustrated in the Cape Town managers’ comments 
that “we don’t have agency”…“we can’t do anything else”. As 
others have noted, the reduction of performance review 
to the measurement of staff to meet targets undermines 
broader health system goals that are more difficult to 
measure or attribute to specific actors’ responsibilities.28 
The undermining of agency and self-determination also 
potentially undermines the intrinsic motivation of staff, a 
vital aspect in maintaining and sustaining health services 
and the health system.29 It has been documented else-
where that an external motivation (like a target being 
reviewed) can undermine the motivation from within 
(such as an intrinsic sense of duty or responsibility) 
through removing a sense of responsibility in the person: 
‘the actor feels that rather than themselves, the person 
undertaking the external intervention is responsible’.30
Further unintended consequences of bureaucratic 
accountability mechanisms that encourage compliance 
are their potential manipulation—what has been called 
‘gaming’. Involving the falsifying of data or adjusting 
the interpretation of the data to suggest improvement; 
a phenomenon linked to control measures of perfor-
mance.31 We observed an example of this in Sedibeng 
in performance appraisal cycles. In other settings it 
has been particularly observed in relation to perfor-
mance-based pay (where there is clear motivation for 
gaming) but also in more routine health worker activities. 
For example, in the implementation of a surgical safety 
checklist in an African university hospital, nurses some-
times ticked the checklist without following the formal 
procedure, as a way of challenging top-down prescrip-
tions, and also because of the work pressures and staff 
shortages.32
Overall, our findings regarding bureaucratic account-
ability processes are that many have laudable goals, with 
potentially important positive implications for healthcare 
and public health. However mechanisms can be poorly 
designed, resourced or implemented, and may be over-
demanding, introduce anxiety and resistance, or clash 
with existing ideas of ‘good practice’. Thus the laudable 
intentions can fail, with damaging implications for staff, 
health delivery and ultimately public health. Regarding 
performance reviews specifically, our findings resonate 
with Barrett’s33 assertion that top-down pressures can 
reduce performance to conformance.33
relationships matter
Our findings illustrate how some managers gravitate 
towards more relational processes of accountability. We 
saw this in a Kilifi subdistrict manager’s response to the 
introduction of user fees (vignette 3) and in the Sedibeng 
manager’s efforts to ensure patients were fed (vignette 
2). In Cape Town to alleviate the negative consequences 
of the performance evaluation, the ‘plan, do, review’ 
meetings between the subdistrict managers and the PHC 
facility managers introduced negotiation and collabo-
rative goal-setting to support shared outcomes, and in 
Kilifi similar elements were introduced to supervision 
meetings. This pattern of introducing and emphasising 
relational elements has also been observed elsewhere. In 
India, for example, Programme Officers indicated how 
informal relationships were necessary to generate ‘respec-
tive and responsive team effort’.9 Some meetings were 
revised to encourage provision of feedback, comments 
and complaints from staff, and collective exchange across 
staff so that there was shared understanding of particular 
practices.9
These findings suggest that for the good intentions of 
bureaucratic accountability mechanisms to be met, rela-
tional/interpersonal elements—or coproduction—are 
essential and should be recognised, valued and even 
supported. This has been successfully tried in Rwanda, 
where a ‘hands-off’ approach was used in a perfor-
mance-based financing initiative. Implementers were 
able to enhance autonomy and promote an innovative 
spirit among health providers through allowing them to 
collaboratively develop their own shared goals and agree 
together on ways to achieve targets.34 Our work would 
suggest the need for more such initiatives. Nevertheless, 
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recognising as noted above how important culture and 
attitude are for the implementation of accountability 
mechanisms,17 such initiatives need to be carefully code-
signed with the range of key actors who have a deep 
understanding of the context and of potential perverse 
outcomes. Furthermore, the potential for perverse 
outcomes and the implications of initiatives for everyday 
resilience of health systems need to be carefully consid-
ered and tracked.
ConCLusIon
Our examination of the micropractices of accountability 
operating at the subcounty or subdistrict level across 
three learning sites shows the multiple directions and 
forms of accountability operating at these levels, and the 
dominance and unintended consequences of bureau-
cratic forms of accountability. We have highlighted the 
importance of relational elements in enabling positive 
goals of bureaucratic accountability and have shown how 
one set of accountability requirements can be creatively 
drawn on to challenge another. We have demonstrated 
the importance in these interpersonal processes of 
coproduction between professionals and between profes-
sionals and others (community members, researchers). 
Our analysis suggests that policies and interventions 
supportive of positive interpersonal interactions and that 
build coproduction are essential to target-based and/or 
audit-style mechanisms achieving their positive intended 
effects. This includes promoting initiatives that recog-
nise value and enable agency of leaders across the health 
system in ways that build everyday resilience and mini-
mise the potential for maladaptation.
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